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EFFECTIVE ACCESS TO THE LAW
Joseph E. Murphy*
The public's ability to know the laws by which it is governed stems
in large part from the accessibility of those laws and from the form in
which the government chooses to publish its laws and regulations. Two
recent court of appeals cases, Building Officials and Code Administrators
v. Code Technology, Inc.1 and Cervase v. Office of the Federal Register,2
appear to assume that there is a right of effective access to the law and a
concomitant duty of the government to facilitate such access.' Al-
though the basic legal premises of these two cases are contrary to well-
established precedents, the holdings are sound, nonetheless, in their
perceptions of the underlying public policy: effective access rights are
inherent in the nature of due process. The most difficult aspect of a
principle of effective access to the law is the accommodation of that
principle with other important rights.
A RIGHT OF EFFECTIVE ACCESS
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in Building
Officials and Code Administrators v. Code Technology, Inc. ,' reversed a
district court's preliminary injunction barring Code Technology from
publishing an edition of the Massachusetts building code. The Massa-
chusetts code was based in large part on a model code for which the
plaintiff BOCA claimed copyright protection as author. The Court of
Appeals cited established law for the proposition that statutes and judi-
cial opinions could not be copyrighted and are in the public domain. It
also noted, however, that there was no case law on the copyrightability
of administrative regulations or of model or uniform codes.'
BOCA observed a growing trend toward adoption of such privately
generated model codes, and refused to rule out some future accommo-
dations between the copyright owner's interests and the public's access
rights. The court was adamant, however, in its declaration of a due
process access right, and cautioned:
[I]t is hard to see how the public's essential due process right of free
* Attorney, The Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania; B.A. 1970, Rutgers University;
J.D. 1973, University of Pennsylvania. Member, New Jersey and Pennsylvania Bars.
I. Building Officials & Code Adm. v. Code Technology, Inc., 628 F.2d 730 (Ist Cir. 1980).
2. Cervase v. Office of the Federal Register, 580 F.2d 1166 (3d Cir. 1978).
3. The corollary to a right of effective access would be a duty of the government to publicize the
law. An analysis of that duty, and a further exposition of the issues associated with promul-
gation of the law, are set forth in Murphy, The Duty of the Government to Make the Law
Known, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 255 (1982).
4. 628 F.2d 730 (1st Cir. 1980).
5. Id. at 733-34.
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access to the law (including a necessary right freely to copy and circu-
late all or part of a given law for various purposes), can be reconciled
with the exclusivity afforded a private copyright holder .... 6
The BOCA court, however, did not offer a final resolution of the issues
before it.
While the First Circuit sailed on a relatively uncharted sea, the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Cervase v. Office of the Fed-
eral Register,7 was called upon to interpet a mundane portion of the
Federal Register Act requiring preparation of an index for the Code of
Federal Regulations.8 The court held that the existence of a table of
contents did not meet this requirement, and that mandamus would lie
to force the production of a usable index. In interpreting the statute,
the court perceived that:
The basic object of [the Federal Register Act] was to eliminate secret
law. We think that the indexing obligation is a central and essential
feature of this congressional plan.9
BOCA, then, reads the previous copyright cases on statutes and ju-
dicial opinions to acknowledge a due process access right, while
Cervase provides extraordinary relief to enforce a perceived congres-
sional policy favoring effective access to Federal administrative law.
Surprisingly, a strong case can be made that the underlying prem-
ises of BOCA and Cervase are contrary to well-established precedents.
The earliest Anglo-American case on making the law known, Rex v.
Bishop of Chichester,'0 established a principle which has remained al-
most unchallenged for six hundred years: statutes need not be pub-
lished to be effective. According to the opinion of Chief Justice
Thorpe, everyone is on notice of what is done in Parliament because
that body represents the whole realm. Thus, whether there is a right of
access vel non, it is access by presumption with no further effort re-
quired by the state.
Bishop of Chichester has formed the core of American law on ques-
tions of access and promulgation. In 1812 it was applied by Circuit
Justice Story in The Ann I to justify confiscating a ship under an em-
bargo act, the passage of which had been unknown and effectively un-
knowable to the operators of the vessel. Shortly thereafter the Supreme
Court concluded that acts of Congress take effect when signed by the
President, with no prior requirement of publication or notice. 12 This
position evidences no concern for a citizen's effective access to the law
in time to conform his or her behavior to such law, and no indication of
6. Id. at 736.
7. 580 F.2d 1166 (3rd Cir. 1978).
8. 44 U.S.C.A. § 1510 (1969).
9. 580 F.2d at 1169.
10. Y.B. 39 Edw. 3, Pasch. 7 (1365). 4 E. COKE, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS 26 (5th ed. 1671)
provides the authoritative translation and interpretation of this case.
11. 1 F. Cas. 926, 927 (No. 397) (C.C.D. Mass. 1812).
12. Arnold v. United States, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 104 (1815).
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any duty in the government to make the law known or knowable before
it takes effect. This early doctrine has extended from Bishop of Chiches-
ter through a number of Supreme Court opinions on the effective date
of statutes 13 and executive orders.' 4 It has been equally accepted by
most state courts,' 5 federal courts,' 6 and authorities on the subject. 17
This laissez-faire approach is not merely a matter of Eighteenth
Century jurisprudence. As recently as 1970 the United States Couft of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in United States v. Cas-
son,18 reaffirmed the concept of immediate effectiveness for acts of
Congress, supporting that conclusion by reference to the earlier English
and American authorities. In Casson, a defendant was convicted for
actions in Washington, D.C., which violated an act signed by the Presi-
dent in Texas, but before news of the signing was released to the press.
Where do Cervase and BOCA fit in this precedential background?
Cervase gave full force to an access policy and statutory language im-
plementing that policy. Other courts, guided by the traditional Anglo-
American doctrines, have not. The Supreme Court, in Federal Crop
Insurance Corp. v. Merrill,'9 read the Federal Register Act to limit the
government's promulgation duty simply to publishing its regulations in
the Federal Register. In other cases, state2" and federal2' courts have
eviscerated, by construction, otherwise straightforward publication re-
quirements. Prior to the era of the Federal Register Act it could well
be argued that there was no policy favoring access to or publication of
13. See Matthews v. Zane, 20 U.S. 164 (1822); Gardner v. Collector, 73 U.S. 499 (1868) (dicta);
Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 381 (1878); Robertson v. Bradbury, 132 U.S. 491 (1889); Jacob
Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264 (1920).
14. See Lapeyre v. United States, 84 U.S. 191 (1873); United States v. Norton, 97 U.S. 164
(1878).
15. See, e.g., Administrators of Weatherford v. Weatherford, 8 Port. 171 (Ala. 1838); People v.
Clark, I Calif. 406 (1851); Smets v. Weatherbee, I Ga. 308 (1837); Goodsell v. Boynton, I Ill.
555 (1839); Temple v. Hays, 1 Iowa 12 (1839); Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184 (1859); Ex
parte De Hay, 3 S.C. 564 (1872). See also State v. Maccioli, 110 N.J.S. 352, 265 A.2d 561,
565 (L. Div. 1970) ("Lack of publication can never rob a [state] Supreme Court ruling of its
efficacy.").
16. See, e.g., United States v. Gavrilovic, 551 F. 2d 1099, 1103 (8th Cir. 1977) (dicta); United
States v. Clizer, 464 F.2d 121, 123 n.2 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1086, reh. denied,
410 U.S. 948; Smith v. Draper, 22 F. Cas. 523 (No. 13,037) (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1865); Central
Md. Lines, Inc. v. United States, 240 F. Supp. 254 (D. Md. 1965); United States v. Chong
Sam, 47 F. 878 (D. Mich. 1891); In re Welman, 20 Vt. 653 (F. Cas. No. 17,407) (U.S.D. Vt.
1844).
17. See, e.g., 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 436 (1866); T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 188 (5th
ed 1883); 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 426 (1826); Thornton, Arrowsmith
v. Hormening, 32 AM. L. REo. 249, 253-54 (1884).
18. United States v. Casson, 434 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
19. 332 U.S. 380 (1947). The Court took this position notwithstanding the fact that a govern-
ment employee had misstated the regulation at issue to the claimant.
20. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 336 So. 2d 59 (La. App. 1976), writ denied, 336 So. 2d 515 (La. 1976)
(interpreting the word "promulgated" in the Civil Code, art. 4., to mean filing with the Secre-
try of State).
21. See, e.g., ASG Industries, Inc. v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 1200, 1241-45 (Cust. Ct. 1979)
(interpreting the words "after the date of publication of the court's decision" in the Tariff Act
of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1516(g), to mean only the day following the entry of the court's order,
notwithstanding the availability of the weekly Customs Bulletin for publication purposes).
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administrative law in American jurisprudence. 22 Moreover, even now
after enactment of the Federal Register Act, there remain jurisdictions
in which publication or notice of the existence of new regulations is not
a condition precedent to their effectiveness. 23
BOCA 's concern for effective access drew precedential support only
from other copyright and related cases. Those cases include Supreme
Court precedent rejecting copyright claims on judicial opinions,24 and
state courts, 25 and lower federal courts26 reaching similar conclusions.
The BOCA court cited no Supreme Court case recognizing a due pro-
cess or other constitutional right regarding effective access. To the con-
trary, the case law indicates that laws become effective before they are
known or knowable. Therefore, it would not seem to matter that a law
or regulation, which everyone is already presumed to know, is not sub-
sequently available for copying. Indeed, the copyright law's require-
ment for filing of materials for use of the Library of Congress 27
arguably exceeds the recognized common law28 or constitutional re-
quirements for access.
SHOULD EFFECTIVE ACCESS BE REQUIRED?
Due Process Requirements
The BOCA court's reference to a due process right reflects the
Supreme Court's pronouncement that certain requirements of notice
are inherent in the nature of due process. In Mullane v. Central Hano-
ver Bank and Trust Co. ,29 the Court reviewed this concept of notice in
22. See Nagle v. United States, 145 F. 302, 306 (2d Cir. 1906); Griswold, Government in Igno-
rance of the Law-4 Pleafor Better Publication ofExecutive Legislation, 48 HARV. L. REv.
198, 204 (1934); Cohen, Publication of State Administrative Regulations - Reform in Slow
Motion, 14 BUFF. L. REv. 410, 410, 414 (1965); Fairlee,Administraive Legislation, 18 MICH.
L. REV. 181, 197 (1920); Hutton, Public Information and Rule Making Provisions 0/the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act of1946, 33 TEMP. L.Q. 58, 59 (1959). But see United States v.
Louisville & N.R.R., 165 F. 936 (W.D. Ky. 1908), and cases cited infra note 28.
23. See, e.g., Nestle Products, Inc. v. United States, 310 F. Supp. 792 (Cust. Ct. 1970) (Puerto
Rico). The State of Delaware has no administrative code and no publication requirement;
New Jersey provides for a code, N.J.S.A. § 52:14B-7 (Supp. 1981), but does not require pub-
lication before a rule takes effect. Id. § 14B-5(b).
24. Callahan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888); Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888); Wheaton
v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
25. Exparte Brown, 116 Ind. 593, 78 N.E. 553 (1906); Nash v. Lathrop, 142 Mass. 29, 6 N.E. 559
(1886). Contra In re Gould & Co., 53 Conn. 415, 2 A. 886 (1886).
26. Connecticut v. Gould, 34 F. 319 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1888); Banks & Bros. v. West Publ. Co., 27
F. 50 (C.C.D. Minn. 1886); Banks v. Manchester, 23 F. 143 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1885); Gould v.
Hastings, 10 Fed. Cas. 877 (No. 5639) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1840). Accord Georgia v. Harrison
Co., 548 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (state legislation).
27. 17 U.S.C. § 407 (Supp. 1 1977).
28. Although they will not be explored here, there are cases which would support an argument
for imposing a promulgation standard under the common law. See Lessee of Albertson v.
Robeson, I Dall. 9 (Pa. 1764) (repeal of an act by king and counsel); The Cotton Planter, 6 F.
Cas. 620 (No. 3270) (C.C.D.N.Y. 18 10) (act of Congress); Railroad Comm'n v. Kansas City
S. Ry., 111 La. 134, 35 So. 487 (1903) (state administrative law); Johnson v. Sargant & Sons,
[1918] 1 K.B. 101 (English administrative law); Rex v. Ross, [1945] 3 D.L.R. 574 (Canadian
administrative law); Harla v. State of Rajasthan, 1951 A.I.R. (S.C.) 467 (Indian administra-
tive law); Lanham, Delegated Legislation and Publication, 37 MOD. L. REv. 510 (1974).
29. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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the context of a civil proceeding. There the only notice given to af-
fected parties was by publication in a local newspaper. The Court ad-
vised that notice of an adjudication must be reasonably calculated to
apprise interested parties of the proceeding and afford them an oppor-
tunity to be heard. If no method would produce a reasonable certainty
of informing all of those affected, the method chosen must not be "sub-
stantially less likely to bring home notice than other of the feasible and
customary substitutes." 3° In that case, newspaper notice was not ade-
quate for "those who could easily be informed by other means at
hand."3
At least one Supreme Court decision 32 and one Federal district
court 33 have applied Mullane to require a notice of the existence of
certain legislative restrictions.34 Given that the due process clause pro-
tects one from being punished or losing property in litigation without
prior notice, it would be a logical extension of this principle to require
some notice before the very law on which the latter adjudication is
based goes into effect. The opportunity to conform one's behavior to
the law appears to be at least as fundamental an entitlement as the
opportunity to defend one's behavior after the fact.
In addition to the teachings of Mullane and the analogy of required
notice in the litigation context, there is the related due process doctrine
that "persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct which will
give rise to criminal penalties. ' 35 This "fair warning" concept bars ju-
dicial action that would have an ex post facto effect 36 and criminal stat-
utes that are too vague to be understood by men of common
intelligence.37 If, as the Supreme Court stated in Marks v. United
States, the fair warning notice is "fundamental to our concept of con-
stitutional liberty," 38 then due process could be expected to require that
some warning be provided before new laws, at least new criminal stat-
utes, take effect. It would follow logically that if due process prohibits
statutes from being so vague that one would have to guess at their
meaning, it would not permit laws to take effect before one could even
guess that they existed.
30. Id. at 315.
31. Id. at 319.
32. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S.225 (1957) (reversing defendant's conviction for failure to
register as a convicted person with the Los Angeles authorities; either actual knowledge or
proof of the probability of such knowledge was required by the Court for a conviction).
33. Armstrong v. Maple Leaf Apartments, Ltd., 436 F. Supp. 1125, 1145-46 (N.D. Okla. 1977),
all'don other grounds, 622 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 901 (1980) (refus-
ing to void a deed of Indian land for noncompliance with a Federal statute which had not
been included in the United States Code).
34. A determinative factor in both cases was probably the otherwise innocuous conduct of the
parties claiming lack of notice.
35. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191 (1977).
36. Id. State v. Moyer, 387 A.2d 194 (Del. 1978).
37. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972); Cass, Ignorance ofthe Law: .4
Maxim Reexamined, 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 671, 674, 680 (1976).




Promulgation increases the effectiveness of law. Providing informa-
tion about the law to those who are regulated by that law will enhance
the efficiency of the regulatory effort and may decrease administrative
and enforcement costs. Clearly a law whose existence is not known
cannot serve a useful purpose as a guide to conduct.
Openness in lawmaking and openness in availability of the law are
associated with the democratic values of American society. Wide-
spread and immediate publication of a law opens the law to scrutiny
and criticism. This increases the opportunity for public comment on
the law's defects and for increased awareness of the need to improve a
particular law. Requiring promulgation may also add an incentive to
the lawmakers to make the laws less abstruse and, therefore, more un-
derstandable to the affected constituencies.
There is also an issue of essential fairness in the question of accessi-
bility. In the words of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in
Nash v. Lathrop,39 in speaking of the law as construed in judicial
opinions:
Every citizen is presumed to know the law thus declared, and it needs
no argument to show that justice requires that all should have free ac-
cess to the opinions, and that it is against sound public policy to pre-
vent this, or to suppress and keep from the earliest knowledge of the
public the statutes, or the decisions and opinions of the justices.4 °
The significance of the access concept and the value of effective pro-
mulgation efforts are magnified with the growth of law in modem
American life. Estimates place the number of new enactments from
legislative bodies ranging from city councils to Congress at 150,000 per
year.41 There are substantially more administrative rules and regula-
tions at every level of government, many in the nature of malum
prohibitum and thus less likely to be known in the absence of a publi-
cation effort. As their numbers and complexity expand, their effective-
ness depends increasingly on the attention devoted to making them
known.42
Alternative Forms of Access
If there is a right to effective access to the law and a duty of the
39. 142 Mass. 29, 6 N.E. 559 (1886).
40. Id. at 35, 6 N.E. at 560.
41. Attorney General William French Smith's Remarks to District of Columbia Bar, ANTITRUST
& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) H-1 (July 2, 1981); Too Much Law, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 10, 1977, at
42, 43.
42. In this respect, government needs to be responsive to the changes in information technology
and willing to utilize that technology to enhance access to the law. Individuals may have
access on home videotex terminals to meet their special needs in such subject areas as airline
schedules and stock prices. See, e.g., The Home Information Revolution, Bus. WEEK, June
29, 1981, at 74. Providing equally timely access to such information as local building code
requirements or the most recent restrictions on asbestos would aid the public in dealing with
the growing bodies of law.
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government to publicize the law and facilitate such access, how should
this be implemented? The first step is to give the subject of promulgat-
ing the law serious review and analysis.43 This analysis should include
consideration of the effectiveness of the existing methods, their advan-
tages and defects. Several questions should be part of this process in-
cluding: Should a law ever take effect before it is known or knowable?
Would lack of public access make a law ineffective? What protection
and enforcement remedies would an individual have if deprived of his
or her right of access?
Among the alternatives available to the government to afford notice
of the law, there are three formal methods frequently used: fixed wait;
record deposit; and record publication. The fixed wait can be a consti-
tutional44 or statutory45 provision delaying the effective date of a new
law to allow time for public review. Under the record deposit ap-
proach, a new law may be required to be deposited in one centralized
office' or at a number of more local offices,4 7 there to be accessible to
the public. Record publication would consist of an official state jour-
nal, such as the Federal Register or the London Gazette, containing new
laws and regulations as they are enacted. The most effective system
would combine the advantages of each of these methods, placing new
rules in the official record, making that record accessible at known lo-
cations, and deferring effective dates until a set time after publication.48
Formal systems set a legal performance minimum, but effective ac-
cess requires more innovative efforts to direct promulgation to the par-
ticular constituencies affected by the law. Probably the most ambitious
example of this exists in the New Jersey Truth-in-Renting Act.49
Under that act the state has produced a statement of established rights
and responsibilities of residential landlords and tenants in that state.
The statement covers such subjects as rent increases, discrimination,
crime insurance, eviction, condition of the premises, and rent-with-
holding remedies. Landlords are required by law to provide a copy to
each tenant and post a copy on the property. This experiment shows
43. See Murphy, supra note 3, at 256 n.5.
44. See, e.g., ALASKA CONsT. art. II, § 18; CAL. CONST. art. 4, § 8; FLA. CONST. art. III, § 9; LA.
COSNT. art. III, § 19; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 27; Mo. CONST. art. III, § 29; UTAH CONST.
art. VI, § 25 (amended 1972); W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 30.
45. See, e.g., 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1701(a)(5) (Purdon Supp. 1981) (statutes); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 2-32 (1958) (same); 5 U.S.C.A. § 553(d) (1976) (administrative regulations); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10118(b) (Supp. 1980) (same); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-4-103(5)
(Supp. 1979) (same); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 227.026(l) (West Supp. 1981) (same).
46. See, e.g., I U.S.C.A. § 106a (1977) (statutes); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-172(b) (Supp.
1981) (administrative regulations); see 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 209
(1965).
47. See, e.g., IND. CONsT. art. 8, § 28 (statutes); ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.140 (1980) (administrative
regulations); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11,343.6, 11,344.2 (1980) (same); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-
32-03.2.1.e (Supp. 1979) (same).
48. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (1976) (combining a record publi-
cation and fixed wait requirement for administrative regulations); Federal Register Act, 44
U.S.C. § 1503 (Supp. IV 1980) (requiring record deposit of administrative regulations).
49. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:8-43 - 8-49 (West Supp. 1981).
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what can be done to advance awareness of the law, if innovative
thought is applied to the process.
THE APPLICATION OF THE EFFECTIVE ACCESS PRINCIPLE
To be effective, any law or regulation needs to be findable. Apply-
ing this principle to Cervase, and applying the due process test of Mul-
lane, there is strong support for the conclusion that an index is a
reasonably calculated method of apprising interested parties of the law
and that a table of contents is "not reasonably calculated to reach those
who could easily be informed by other means at hand."50 This conclu-
sion, when applied to the interpretation of a specific statutory directive
to produce such an index, appears to be beyond challenge.5
Also at issue in Cervase was the availability of mandamus as a rem-
edy. Given the evidently ministerial nature of the indexing function,
there is ample precedential support for the invocation of this remedy to
facilitate access to the law.5"
BOCA provides a much more difficult setting for applying the effec-
tive access concept, because of the collision in that case of substantial,
competing interests. Weighing against the public's interest in access to
the law is the private property right in the creation of intellectual prop-
erty. The Copyright Act53 must be allowed its full strength to protect
that right and to promote the creative activity which results in such
publicly beneficial products as model codes and uniform statutes.
It is possible to protect both interests and still have the advantage of
private authorship of laws. Legislatures and administrative agencies
can negotiate with and purchase from authors the full duplication
rights associated with a particular code. This could impose on the first
adopting jurisdiction a disproportionate cost, since succeeding jurisdic-
tions would then have free access to the materials in the public domain.
This could be partially obviated by joint purchase by more than one
such jurisdiction. What is more likely, however, is that private authors
will obtain economic advantage in the same way that private court re-
porters and statute compilers do: the author would have the best claim
as an authoritative commentator, annotator, compiler, indexer, and the
like, and would exploit that position to full economic advantage. It has
repeatedly been held that such annotations, comments and other works
50. 339 U.S. at 319.
51. The background of the passage of the Federal Register Act and the later Administrative
Procedure Act strongly support the Cervase court's statement of the congressional policy
supporting its interpretation. See Griswold, supra note 22; Cohen, supra note 22, at 413-14;
Hutton, supra note 22, at 59-62.
52. See State ex rel. Browning v. Blankenship, 175 S.E.2d 172 (W. Va. 1970) (publication of
statutes); Capito v. Topping, 65 W. Va. 587, 64 S.E. 845 (1909) (same); State ex rel. Martin v.
Zimmerman, 233 Wis. 16, 288 N.W. 454 (1939) (same); Nash v. Lathrop, 142 Mass. 29, 6
N.E. 559 (1886) (access to judicial opinions); People ex rel. Wailer v. Board of Supervisors,
56 N.Y. 249 (1874) (publication of session laws by county supervisors).
53. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (Supp. 1 1977).
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of private authors are copyrightable.5 4
If an author refused to sell his or her rights, there may be an argu-
ment that the state could assert eminent domain principles for the ob-
taining of such intellectual property. This could raise serious first
amendment 55 concerns and enormously difficult issues in determining
the market value of such writings. For both policy and practical rea-
sons, in the unlikely event that an author would refuse to sell his or her
copyright,5 6 it is preferable for the government to write its own laws or
commission someone else to do so. It bears repeating in this regard
that the copyright protects only forms of expression, and not ideas.
BOCA, of course, is past the stage of initial purchase negotiations.
The court there has the option of holding BOCA's materials to be in
the public domain, on the theory that the copyright owner waived its
rights. But there are also alternatives consistent with protecting the
copyright. The court could take the dramatic step of upholding the
copyright, and then declaring the law ineffective because of the limits
on its accessibility. Alternatively, it could determine that there has
been infringement, but refuse an injunction on public policy and due
process grounds. It would then appropriately hold the state responsible
for all the infringement which occurs from copying the state's code and
assess a reasonable charge against the state to compensate the copyright
owner. If this were done it is predictable that Congress would quickly
amend the Copyright Act to establish a procedure for this arrangement.
A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
A legislative solution to the BOCA dilemma should start with a
statement of Congress' commitment to the effective access concept.57
This statement would guide the judiciary in its interpretation of the
statute. The Nash" opinion provides an appropriate source for such a
statement. It should be clearly stated that no law or regulation can be
limited in its public availability by the Copyright Act. The reasonable
regulation referred to in Nash, to ensure the accuracy of published
54. See, e.g., Callahan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888) (copyright protection of headnotes, etc., in
court reports); West Publ. Co. v. Lawyers' Coop. Publ. Co., 64 F. 360 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1894)
(same); W.H. Anderson Co. v. Baldwin Law Publ. Co., 27 F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1928) (copyright
protection of annotations, etc., in statute books). See Note, Copyright of Statute Compila-
tions, 32 Ky. L.J. 76 (1943); Patterson, On Copyrighting 'Law", 13 GA. ST. B.J. 60 (1976)
(arguing that the practical effect of permitting copyright protection for headnotes, indices,
etc., is to provide an exclusive right over something that should be in the public domain). But
see Georgia v. Harrison Co., 548 F. Supp. 110, 115 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (no copyright in title,
chapter, and article headings).
55. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Cf. Alamo Motor Lines v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local
657, 229 S.W.2d 112, 117 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) (First amendment would prevent court from
prohibiting publication of an opinion by newspapers, publishing firms and others).
56. As one who has written a proposed statute for publication in a copyrighted journal, this
author can think of no good reason for refusing such an offer. See Murphy, The Self-Evalua-
tive Privilege, 7 J. CORP. LAW 489, appendices "A" and "B" (1982).
57. The appendix to this article is a draft of one such proposal. The author waives any copyright
claim for that appendix.
58. Nash v. Lathrop, 142 Mass. 29, 6 N.E. 559 (1886).
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laws, would be permitted. The effect of this would be to codify the
common law standard.
Balancing the governmental interest against the copyright interests
would be the most critical step. Here an analogy can be drawn to the
mandatory licensing provisions applicable to cable television's retrans-
mission of signals.5 9 A governmental body could incorporate copy-
righted material in its published materials, thereby placing the
incorporated materials in the public domain. The parties could agree
to an appropriate charge, or be subject to a fee to be set by an in-
dependent tribunal. Payment should not be required where the incor-
porated material would otherwise be subject to the fair use exception.





To provide for effective access to the law.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States ofAmerica in Congress assembled.
SECTION 1. It is the intent of Congress that all people should have
free and full access to the statutes, regulations, laws and orders which
govern them, and to the decisions and opinions of the judiciary.
SECTION 2. No act of Congress, or of any legislature, nor any opin-
ion or order of any court, nor any rule, regulation, order or opinion of
any executive, administrative agency or commission, nor any other
rule, regulation, interpretative opinion, law, ordinance, order, code of
conduct or ethics, or the like, of any government or governmental body
or agency, shall be subject to registration or protection under the Copy-
right Act of 1976, nor be subject to any other restrictions on copying
under any law, except for such reasonable laws as are necessary to reg-
ulate the mode of promulgation so as to give such acts, opinions, rules,
etc., accuracy and authority.
SECTION 3. Any governmental body or other entity barred from
claiming copyright protection in material subject to section 2 above,
may nevertheless include in such material, material created by others
which is otherwise subject to copyright protection. In such cases, only
that specific portion and language as is published by such body or en-
tity shall not be subject to copyright protection. The owner of the
copyright in such included material shall be entitled to payment by
such body or entity, of a reasonable royalty to be determined by the
Copyright Royalty Tribunal, unless the parties have agreed to other
terms. This payment requirement shall not apply to brief inclusions
subject to a right of fair use, which do not significantly diminish the
value of the copyright owner's rights in such material.
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